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It has become standard practice among opponents of the Affordable Care Act to refer to 
the bill as a “jobs killer.” The idea is that the sanctions applied to employers who do not 
provide insurance to their workers are so onerous, that they will change their hiring patterns 
to avoid them. There are two obvious ways to avoid the sanctions. First, firms can keep the 
total number of workers at a firm under 50, and in this way avoid being subject to sanctions. 
Second firms can reduce the number of hours that employees work so that they fall under 
the 30 hour a week average that would have them count towards the firm’s penalty under 
the ACA. 
 
There are good reasons for questioning the extent to which the employer penalty provisions 
in the ACA would affect employment. Most importantly, the overwhelming majority of 
firms that employ more than 50 workers already provide health care coverage to their 
workers that would meet the standards of the ACA. According to a survey by the Kaiser 
Family Foundation more than 94 percent of firms that exceed the ACA’s 50 workers cutoff 
already provided coverage to their workers voluntarily.1 Clearly these firms consider it a 
good practice to offer a valuable benefit to their workers or they would not do so.  Since 
most firms in this category already provide coverage voluntarily, it is difficult to believe that 
requiring the remaining firms to provide coverage or pay a penalty would create such an 
onerous burden. 
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Furthermore, the penalty for not providing insurance of $2,000 per worker (excluding the 
first 30 workers), seems relatively modest. If the pay of full-time workers averaged just $10 
an hour, this would be an increase in annual compensation of less than 10 percent. A 
considerable amount of research has found no measureable employment impact from 
considerably larger increases in the minimum wage.2 
 
For these reasons it seemed unlikely that the ACA would have a large negative impact on 
employment. However, there have been numerous accounts of employers claiming to 
reduce employment or adjust hours in order to avoid the obligations of the ACA. If this is 
the case, we should have first begun to see evidence of the impact of ACA in January of 
2013, since under the original law employment in 2013 would serve as the basis for assessing 
penalties in 2014. (The Obama administration announced on July 2, 2013 that they would 
not enforce sanctions in 2014 based on 2013 employment,3 but employers would not have 
known that sanctions would not be enforced prior to this date. Therefore we can assume 
that they would have behaved as though they expect to be subject to the sanctions and acted 
accordingly.) 
 
Some employers claim to have reduced employment because of the provisions of the ACA 
as soon as its passage in 2010, and many have blamed the ACA for the slow pace of 
employment growth in the years from 2010-2012. This is not plausible. There is enormous 
churning in the labor market, with close to 3 percent of employees leaving their job every 
month (half voluntarily and half involuntarily).4 If an employer felt the need to hire 
additional employers in 2010-2012 to meet the demand for labor they were seeing at the 
time, they would have no difficulty getting their employment. Just the normal churning in 
the labor market would bring a firm with 52 or 53 employees below the 50 employee 
threshold in a few months. Since employers generally have the option to dismiss workers at 
will (unless they have a union contract), there is no reason that they could not have added 
employees in the years prior to 2013 to meet their demand for labor and then reduce 
employment in 2013 to avoid the ACA penalties.  
 
The Evidence from 2013 
It is too early to assess the claim that employers are staying just below the 50 employee limit 
since we do not yet have data available on employment by firm size in 2013. However as a 
practical matter it is implausible that the behavior of these firms could have any noticeable 
effect on employment growth. It is unlikely that more than 1 percent of potential 
employment growth would be in firms that are near this cutoff. Furthermore, most of these 
firms would already be providing health care insurance for their employees and therefore 
need not be concerned about the sanctions in the ACA. If some number of firms actually 
are limiting or reducing employment to stay below the 50 worker cutoff then the impact 
would be too small to be noticed in the economy as a whole. 
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The alternative course of evading ACA penalties, reducing average hours of work below 30 
per week, could at least plausibly have an impact on employment patterns. In fact, several 
large employers have claimed that they would deliberately keep workers’ hours below 30 
hours per week in order to avoid having them count toward the number for whom they 
would have a $2,000 penalty. Some surveys of small businesses also report that employers 
intend to reduce workers’ hours to avoid the penalty, even they are not bound by the law. 
 
Fortunately, it is possible to test whether employers are actually reducing hours below the 
30-hour threshold. The Current Population Survey (CPS) provides monthly data on workers 
usual weekly hours. We used the CPS to compare the first four months of 2013 with the 
first four months of 2012. We looked at the numbers and percent of workers who reported 
working 26-29 hours a week. We considered this range a reasonable cutoff for an ACA 
effect. Presumably if an employer would have a worker put in more than 30 hours a week in 
the absence of ACA penalties, they would require a worker to put in close to, but less than, 
30 hours in order to avoid the penalties. 
 
Table 1 shows the results. There are two points that are striking. First a very small share of 
the workforce falls into this group. Well under 1 million workers, roughly 0.6 percent of the 
labor force, typically work between 26-29 hours a week. It is also important to remember 
that many of these workers choose to work less than a full-time job. More than two-thirds 
of the workers who report working less than full-time jobs say that they are doing so by 
choice. If this ratio also applies to the workers who usually work between 26-29 hours it 
would mean that less than 300,000 workers, or roughly 0.2 percent of the workforce, are 
working this number of hours as a result of their employer’s decision. 
 
TABLE 1 
Number of employees usually working 26-29 hours per week in primary job 
 
Number of Employees  
 
Percent of Employees 
 
Working 26-29 hours/week 
 
Working 26-29 hours/week 
 
2012 2013 
 
2012 2013 
January 881,903 791,946   0.63% 0.56% 
February 837,345 854,661 
 
0.59% 0.60% 
March 876,780 835,543   0.62% 0.58% 
April 816,468 927,034 
 
0.57% 0.64% 
      Unweighted Monthly Average 853,124 852,296   0.6037% 0.5968% 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Current Population Survey 
Notes:  Analysis of the Current Population Survey, Monthly Basic Data, Jan-Apr 2012 and Jan-Apr 2013. 
Looks at everyone who reported usually working, including 'hours varied' and '0 hours' 
 
The other striking aspect to the data in Table 1 is that the number and percentage of 
workers putting in between 26-29 hours per week was slightly lower in 2013 than in 2012. 
The average percentage of workers in this category for 2013 was 0.597 percent. That is 
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down from 0.604 percent in 2012. While this drop is not close to being statistically 
significant, the change is in the wrong direction for the ACA as job-killer story.  
 
While there may certainly be instances of individual employers carrying through with threats 
to reduce their employees’ hours to below 30 to avoid the sanctions in the ACA, the 
numbers are too small to show up in the data. It appears that in setting worker hours 
employers are responding to business considerations in much the same way as they did 
before the ACA took effect. While the sanctions in the ACA may provide some marginal 
incentive to reduce worker hours below the 30-hour cutoff, other considerations in setting 
worker hours appear to be far more important. 
 
Conclusion 
Opponents of the ACA have labeled the health care bill a jobs killer. It is unclear that the bill 
could be expected to have much impact on employment except among the relatively small 
number of firms that are near the 50-worker cutoff. However the bill does provide a clear 
incentive to reduce workers’ hours below 30 per week and many employers claim to be 
making such reductions in hours. 
  
An analysis of data from the Current Population Survey shows that only a small number (0.6 
percent of the workforce) of workers report working just below the 30 hour cutoff in the 
range of 26-29 hours per week. Furthermore, the number of workers who fall in this 
category was actually lower in 2013 than in 2012, the year before the sanctions would have 
applied. This suggests that employers do not appear to be changing hours in large numbers 
in response to the sanctions in the ACA. 
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